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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a scenario where a government has inflicted horrific
violence on its own citizens. Imagine that this violence amounts to a
crime against humanity, and perhaps even genocide. It shouldn't be
hard to imagine such a scenario. Throughout the twentieth century,
numerous governments were involved in egregious violations of
human rights, often committed against their own citizens.' Is there-
and should there be-legal recourse in U.S. courts for the victims of
such violence?
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) 2 establishes federal jurisdiction over
extraterritorial violations of international law,3 enabling victims of
torture, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes to bring
civil suits in U.S. federal courts. 4 Though the statute, by its terms,
applies broadly to torts in violation of international law, courts
exercise "judicial caution" 5 in determining whether a cause of action
is cognizable under the ATS. The Supreme Court's recent
proclamation that an otherwise valid cause of action under the ATS is
subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality has further
limited access to U.S. courts for victims of international human rights
violations. 6
1. See U.N. Secretary-General, Final Report of the United Nations
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780,
151-305, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The ATS is also referred to as the Alien Tort
Claims Act. AM. LAW SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, BENCHBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
III.E-2 (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014) [hereinafter BENCHBOOK], available at
http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/benchbook/ASILBenchbook Complete.pdf;
see also, e.g., Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999)
(referring to the ATS as the "Alien Tort Claims Act").
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73, codified at note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), is
another significant tool for litigating violations of human rights in U.S. courts,
although it cannot be used as the cause of action against a state. See Mohamed v.
Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012).
4. BENCHBOOK, supra note 2, at III.E-7-8.
5. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
6. See discussion of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659
(2013), infra Part I.A.
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Where the plaintiff alleges a tort in violation of international law
recognized by the ATS against a foreign state, the plaintiff must also
establish an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA)7 which generally provides immunity to foreign sovereigns.8
Thus, although the ATS gives the U.S. courts jurisdiction over cases
involving international human rights violations, the FSIA is often a
substantial barrier for victims seeking to obtain civil remedies in the
U.S. 9
Even where the requirements of the ATS are met and an exception
to the FSIA is found, a court may decline to hear a case it deems a
nonjusticiable political question.10 The political question doctrine is
rooted in the principles of separation of powers and judicial restraint,11
and its basic premise is that courts should not hear cases that would
prevent the political branches, i.e. the legislative and executive
branches, from fulfilling their duties.1 2 The doctrine arises when the
judiciary and the political branches have overlapping responsibilities,
such as when judicial review implicates foreign affairs, as is often the
case when a victim of human rights violations seeks redress against a
foreign nation in U.S. courts.
1 3
This article argues that U.S. courts are inappropriately applying
the political question doctrine to dismiss international human rights
cases. The severity of the wrongs speaks to the need for justice.
Human rights violations occur every day in countries around the
world.1 4 These violations are committed by individuals, groups, and
states, and create an uncountable number of victims.1 5 The political
7. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2006).
8. Id. § 1604; BENCHBOOK, supra note 2, at III.E-12.
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. Eric Gruzen, Comment, The United States as a Forum for Human Rights
Litigation: Is This the Best Solution?, 14 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 207, 226 (2001).
12. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962).
13. See, e.g., cases cited infra Part.II.
14. Human Rights Issues, AMNESTY INT'L USA,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues (last visited May 25, 2015).
15. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Final Report of the United Nations
Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780,
310-314, 319, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994) (discussing extent of harms
20151
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branches have given these victims the right to seek legal recourse in
U.S. courts through the ATS and the FSIA exceptions.1 6 U.S. courts,
however, have declined to hear cases involving egregious wrongs
cognizable under the ATS-such as crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide-because adjudication might impede on
politically sensitive issues.1 7 The judiciary's excessive deference to
the executive branch on issues properly before the court results in
uneven application of the law, is contrary to the purpose of the ATS
and FSIA, and deprives victims of human rights violations of redress
in U.S. courts.
Part II.A of this article argues that in ATS cases against foreign
sovereigns, any application of the political question doctrine is
improper.18 Where an ATS case is filed against a foreign sovereign,
the plaintiff must show that an FSIA exception to immunity applies. 19
Because the legislative process for the enactment of the ATS and
FSIA involved an intentional delegation of certain international issues
to the courts, 20 cases that fall within the bounds of those statutes
caused by human rights violations, including crimes against humanity and
genocide).
16. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1350, 1605-1605a (2006).
17. Gwynne Skinner, Comment, The Nonjusticiability of Palestine: Human
Rights Litigation and the (Mis)Application of the Political Question Doctrine, 35
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 99, 102 (2012).
18. Courts may use the political question doctrine to dismiss cases before
hearing them on their merits in order to promote judicial economy. See Sinochem
Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007). However, this
article argues that it is doctrinally improper to use the political question doctrine to
dismiss FSIA and ATS cases before hearing them on their merits, because such
dismissal would misapply the separation of powers doctrine. See discussion infra
Part.I.A.
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2006).
20. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), available at
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.leghis/fsiv0001 &id= 1 &collection=leg
his&index=leghis/fsiv#113 (explaining that a "principal purpose" of the FSIA was
to transfer sovereign immunity determinations from the executive branch to the
judicial branch); S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 12 (1976), available at
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.leghis/fsiv0001 &id= 1 &collection=leg
his&index=leghis/fsiv#176 (explaining that federal district courts' subject matter
jurisdiction extended "to any claim with respect to which the foreign state is not
entitled to immunity" under the FSIA) (emphasis added)). Because the ATS was
enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 rather than as an independent act,
[Vol. 51
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should be considered prima facie justiciable. In other words, the FSIA
exceptions represent the political branches' determination that, in
certain instances, the adjudication of an ATS claim against a foreign
sovereign is proper. Thus, where a plaintiff has properly pleaded an
ATS claim and an exception to the FSIA, engaging in a political
question doctrine analysis is duplicative, and the claim should not be
dismissed based on separation of powers concerns.
Part JJ.B argues that even in ATS cases that do not implicate the
FSIA, the application of the political question doctrine is problematic
because courts apply it inconsistently to avoid hearing cases involving
international human rights violations. Although a political question
doctrine analysis is not necessarily duplicative in these cases-and
thus seems more appropriate, this doctrine should not be utilized as a
means to grant excessive deference to the executive branch. By
inappropriately dismissing claims in this context, courts have
increasingly deprived foreign plaintiffs of redress in U.S. courts for
international wrongs perpetrated by-or even merely implicating-the
U.S. or its political allies.
I. MECHANISMS FOR FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS' REDRESS IN U.S. COURTS
To understand the problem addressed in this article, an overview
of the ATS, the FSIA, and the political question doctrine is necessary.
As mentioned, the ATS gives the U.S. courts subject matter
jurisdiction over torts involving violations of international law. 21
Where the defendant is a foreign sovereign, the FSIA is invoked as a
defense, and the plaintiff must establish that an exception applies. 22
The political question doctrine reflects concerns of judicial restraint
legislative documents suggesting Congress' intent in codifying the statute do not
exist. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32118, THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH VIEwS 2 (2003).
Notably, however, some theorize the ATS was intended to bestow American courts
with "universal jurisdiction" to specifically address "crimes that are so egregious as
to be the object of universal concern, regardless of the situs of the offense and the
nationalities of the offenders or victims." Id. at 10.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
22. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F. Supp. 1094, 1106
(S.D.N.Y 1982). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2006)
(articulating exceptions).
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and separation of powers23 that this article argues need not be
considered in ATS cases implicating the FSIA, and it is increasingly
inappropriately invoked to dismiss cognizable ATS claims.
A. The Alien Tort Statute
The full text of the ATS reads: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."24 This language enables U.S. courts to adjudicate cases arising
out of violations of the law of nations. 25 Despite the apparent breadth
of the ATS, it was invoked infrequently as a basis for jurisdiction for
almost two centuries after its enactment.
26
Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala was the first modem case to invoke the
ATS as the basis for human rights litigation. 27 There, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, a Paraguayan police officer, had tortured
her brother on behalf of the government.28 She argued that the claim
fell within the purview of the ATS because the defendant's conduct
violated international law.29  Thus, one of the central issues in
Filartiga was whether the ATS applied to all violations of
international law or only those recognized at the time the ATS was
enacted.30
In 1789, the only recognized violations of international law were
piracy, violations of safe conduct, and infringements on the rights of
ambassadors. 31 By 1980, however, international law had developed
significantly and, largely in response to World War II, had expanded
23. Gruzen, supra note 11, at 226.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
25. The term "international law" is used to refer to what was then known as
the "law of nations." See BENCHBOOK, supra note 2, at II.E-5; see also Filartiga v.
Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing the nation's observation
of "norms of international law, formerly known as the law of nations").
26. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887.
27. See generally Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876.
28. Id. at 878.
29. Id. at 879.
30. Id. at 880-84.
31. Id. at 880; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
230 [Vol. 51
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to include many new prohibitions. 32 The plaintiff in Filartiga relied
on a violation of the jus cogens norm against torture, a violation that
did not exist in 1789. 33 Finding that torture was cognizable under the
ATS, the court held that "courts must interpret international law not as
it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of
the world today."
34
In the first U.S. Supreme Court case directly addressing the scope
of the ATS, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court set forth a framework
for determining whether a tort claim based on violations of
international law is cognizable under the ATS.35 In Sosa, a Mexican
drug cartel kidnapped and executed a U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration special agent. 36 Following an investigation into the
death of the agent, the U.S. discovered that a Mexican doctor,
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, had revived the agent in order to
continue torturing him.37  As a result, the U.S. hired a group of
bounty-hunter Mexican nationals to bring Alvarez-Machain to the
U.S. to stand trial.38
The Court held that claims under the ATS must "rest on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms .... 39 Justice Breyer also reiterated the Court's position
that "to qualify for recognition under the ATS a norm of international
law must have a content as definite as, and an acceptance as
widespread as, those that characterized 18th-century international
norms prohibiting piracy." 4° Thus, under Sosa, the ATS provides a
cause of action for any violation of international law that is as
specifically defined as those recognized in 1789.41 In light of that
32. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-84.
33. See id. at 882.
34. Id. at 881.
35. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
36. Id. at 697, 702.
37. Id. at 697; BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 18 (2d ed. 2008).
38. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 698.
39. Id. at 725.
40. Id. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring).
41. See id. at 725; id. at 760 (Breyer, J., concurring).
20151
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rule, because the twenty-four hour unauthorized detention was not a
sufficiently universally recognized violation of international law in
2004, the Court rejected Alvarez-Machain's claim. 42
In the only other U.S. Supreme Court decision on the scope of the
ATS, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Court held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to ATS claims. 43  In
Kiobel, Nigerian citizens claimed that Dutch, British, and Nigerian oil
companies had aided and abetted the Nigerian Government in
violently suppressing peaceful demonstrations opposing oil
development. 44 The plaintiffs claimed that defendants' acts included
crimes against humanity; torture; cruel, inhumane, and degrading
treatment; unlawful killing; forced exile; destruction of property; and
violations of the rights to life, liberty, and security. 45
The Court of Appeals originally affirmed dismissal of plaintiffs'
claims on the grounds that no norm imposed liability on corporations
for violations of the law of nations. 46 The appellate court reasoned
that, because corporate personhood was neither readily discernible nor
universally recognized, there was no "specific, universal, and
obligatory ' 47 norm imposing liability on corporations for violations of
customary international law. 48
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the presumption
against extraterritoriality warranted dismissal, and avoided ruling on
the issue of corporate liability. 49  The presumption against
extraterritoriality is the principle that "legislation of Congress, unless
a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." 50  Courts apply this presumption
when a statute does not explicitly address the question of
42. Id. at 733-34, 738.
43. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1661-62 (2013).
44. Id. at 1662.
45. Id. at 1663.
46. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010), aff'd,
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
47. Id. at 120 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
48. Id. at127-28.
49. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
50. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010) (quoting
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citation omitted)).
[Vol. 51
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extraterritoriality. 51 Because there was no such express statement in
the single sentence that constitutes the complete text of the ATS, the
Court applied the presumption against extraterritoriality and, finding
no basis on which to rebut it, declined to extend the ATS to wholly
extraterritorial conduct. 52  Accordingly, the Court held that claims
pursued under the ATS must "touch and concern the territory of the
United states ... with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritorial[ity]. '
After Kiobel, plaintiffs may bring an ATS case based on
sufficiently defined violations of international law so long as the
alleged conduct sufficiently touches and concerns U.S. territory.
54
Thus, any jus cogens violation, 55 such as war crimes, crimes against
humanity, torture, and racial discrimination, could be the basis for a
plaintiffs claim so long as there is a sufficient nexus with the U.S. to
satisfy the "touch and concern" standard.
The presumption against extraterritoriality has not meant an end
to ATS suits. Since the Kiobel decision, courts have applied the
"touch and concern" standard with varying, and even inconsistent,
outcomes. 56 Because the "touch and concern" test is vague, and the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel does not give much guidance
51. BENCHBOOK, supra note 2, at II.A-12-13.
52. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. 247).
55. That is, a violation of "'a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole .... .- Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d
763, 775 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331).
56. Compare Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 315-
24 (D. Mass. 2013) (finding jurisdiction under ATS over a U.S. corporation that
allegedly aided and abetted human rights violations), and Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947
F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding jurisdiction under ATS over foreign
defendants involved with bombing outside U.S. embassy in Kenya), with Kaplan v.
Cent. Bank of Islamic Rep. of Iran, 961 F. Supp. 2d 185, 205 (D.D.C. 2013)
(declining to find jurisdiction under the ATS for an attack that affected some
Americans, but was planned and executed completely on foreign soil, did not "touch
and concern" the United States), and Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190
(2d Cir. 2013) (declining to apply the "touch and concern" analysis, because all
relevant conduct occurred abroad).
20151
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to lower courts, 57 it will probably be some time before the meaning of
this requirement becomes clear.
58
B. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Sovereign immunity originates in the notion that the "king can do
no wrong." 59 The most well-known, early case to discuss sovereign
immunity was Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.60  That decision
created a case-by-case standard for the adjudication of issues of
sovereign immunity. 61 Under this approach, courts would defer to the
executive branch on whether to grant sovereign immunity.
62
In 1952, the State Department issued a letter establishing its
general position on foreign sovereign immunity, known as the Tate
Letter, which provided the basis for judicial application of foreign
sovereign immunity. 63  During this time, the immunity granted to
foreign sovereigns was limited to acts by the sovereign that were the
type exclusively reserved to sovereigns, as distinguished from suits
brought against a sovereign acting in a private, commercial capacity.
64
Thus, until the FSIA was passed in 1972, sovereign immunity was
determined primarily by the executive branch.65
57. Indeed, the various concurring opinions in Kiobel further muddy the water.
In addition, the Court left open the issue of corporate liability. See In re S. African
Apartheid Litig, 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 458-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (discussing Kiobel's
impact on corporations and applying the "touch and concern" test to a corporate
defendant).
58. Predicting how narrow or broad the next U.S. Supreme Court decision on
"touch and concern" will be and analyzing the different circuits' interpretations are
beyond the scope of this article, but will be key for plaintiffs trying to assert
jurisdiction under the ATS. Given the lack of legal context of this phrase, one
reasonable way that the Court could interpret the phrase would be to consider it a
"nexus" requirement, such as that used in applying the FSIA. See infra Part I.B. 1.
59. Gruzen, supra note 11, at 227 (citations omitted).
60. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
61. Y. David Huang, Note, "Direct Effect in the United States" Under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After Cruise Connections v. Attorney General of
Canada, 3 GEO. MASON J. INT'L COM. L. 179, 182 (2011).
62. BENCHBOOK, supra note 2, at II.B-2.
63. Carolyn J. Brock, Note, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Defining a
Role for the Executive, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 795, 800-01 (1990).
64. See Gruzen, supra note 11, at 240.
65. See Brock, supra note 63, at 802-03.
[Vol. 51
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In 1972, at the behest of the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General,66 the decision about whether to extend sovereign immunity
was taken out of the hands of the Executive and entrusted to the
judiciary. 67 Congress enacted the FSIA, which provided a statutory
basis and firm standards for determining sovereign immunity, 6 thus
removing the need for a case-by-case analysis by the Executive.
Moreover, the FSIA was a proclamation by the political branches that
courts had the authority and duty to decide whether sovereigns were
entitled to immunity, regardless of the inherent and possibly negative
effect on foreign affairs.
69
Under the FSIA, foreign sovereigns, as well as their political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, are presumed immune
from civil liability in U.S. courts.70 Although the FSIA does not bar a
cause of action, it limits the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to hear claims
against foreign states.",7 1 However, the FSIA lists several exceptions,
where the sovereign is not afforded immunity. 2 Indeed, Congress
66. Id. at 800, 802-03; see also Letter from Richard J. Kleindienst, Attorney
Gen., & William P. Rodgers, Sec'y of State, to Spiro Agnew, President of the
Senate, & Carl Albert, Speaker of the House, (Jan. 22, 1973), reprinted in 12 I.L.M.
118, 120 (1973) [hereinafter Kleindienst Letter].
67. Brock, supra note 63, at 802-03.; see also Rep. of Austria v. Altmann, 541
U.S. 677, 699 (2004) (noting that one principal purpose of the FSIA was
"eliminating political participation in the resolution of such claims.").
68. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (2006).
69. See Verlinden V.B. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 488 ("In 1976,
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in order to free the
Government from the case-by-case diplomatic pressures, to clarify the governing
standards, and to '[assure] litigants that.., decisions are made on purely legal
grounds and under procedures that insure due process."') (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
94-1487, at 7 (1976)).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2006); Altmann, 541 U.S. at 691. The FSIA does
not apply to individual government officials. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S.
305, 310 (2010) (citation omitted).
71. Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2010).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 lists the exceptions to immunity: waiver, commercial
activity, expropriation, immovable property, money damages related to the death or
injury of an individual in the U.S. caused by a foreign sovereign, enforcement of
arbitration agreements, terrorism, and commercial maritime liens. 28 U.S.C. § 1605
(2006).
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intended for the FSIA to be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction
over a foreign state in our courts.
73
1. Commercial Activity Exception
The Commercial Activity Exception states:
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case .. in which the
action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state or upon an act performed in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States
in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
74
Courts have defined the sometimes blurred distinction between
commercial and sovereign acts of states by requiring that the
exception requires that: (1) the conduct was commercial; 75 (2) the
commercial conduct had a direct effect in the U.S.; 7 6 and (3) there was
a nexus between the commercial conduct and the harmful effect in the
U.S.
7 7
To determine whether conduct should be considered commercial,
courts typically apply the "private person" standard created by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v.
Federal Republic of Nigeria.78 That case involved a contract dispute
between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and several private sellers of
cement. 79 The Second Circuit looked to the legislative history of the
Commercial Activity Exception, and found that Congress deliberately
"left the meaning open and . . . 'put (its) faith in the U.S. courts to
work out progressively, on a case-by-case basis the distinction
73. Argentine Rep. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 434
(1989).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012).
75. Tex. Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed. Rep. of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 307-
08 (2d Cir. 1981).
76. Rep. of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 609, 611-12 (1992).
77. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 370 (1992).
78. Tex. Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 309.
79. Id. at 304-05.
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between commercial and governmental., 80  The court alternately
defined commercial activity as "one in which a private person could
engage." 
81
In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, the Supreme Court adopted
the "private party" test and clarified the standard for determining
whether conduct has a "direct effect" within the U.S. 82 The Supreme
Court defined commercial activity as "the type of actions by which a
private party engages in... commerce." 83  In Weltover, the issue
before the Court was whether Argentina was subject to suit under the
FSIA for a breach of contract claim arising out of its default on certain
bonds. 84 Argentina had issued the bonds as part of a plan to stabilize
its currency-a purpose that was clearly in the nature of sovereign
activity; however, the conduct fell within the Commercial Activity
Exception because private parties commonly issue debt instruments
similar to these bonds. 85 The Court continued on to state that although
the "direct effects" test cannot be satisfied by trivial conduct, the
commercial conduct does not need to be substantial or foreseeable.
86
Because New York was the place of performance for the contract and
Argentina had begun repayment, the Court held that Argentina's
conduct had a direct effect within the U.S.: "Money that was supposed
to have been delivered to a New York bank was not forthcoming." 87
80. Id. at 309 (quoting 1976 Hearings at 53 (testimony of Monroe Leigh).
Accord, House Report at 6615; Hearings on H.R. 3493 Before Subcommittee on
Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973) ("1973 Hearings") (testimony of Charles N. Brower,
Legal Adviser, Department of State).
81. Tex. Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F. 2d at 309 (citing Hearings at 24
(testimony of Monroe Leigh), 53 (same); 1973 Hearings at 15 (testimony of Charles
N. Brower)).
82. Rep. of Arg. v. Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 611-12 (1992).
83. Id. at 614 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 270 (6th ed. 1990)).
84. Id. at 609.
85. Id. at 615-16.
86. Id. at 618.
87. Id. at 619; see also Ampac Grp., Inc. v. Rep. of Honduras, 797 F. Supp.
973, 977 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (confirming that "an effect is 'direct' if it follows as an
immediate consequence of the defendant's activity" (quoting Rep. of Arg. v.
Weltover, 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992))); Commercial Bank of Kuwait v. Rafidain
Bank, 15 F.3d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the Commercial Activity
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In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, the Supreme Court held that the
Commercial Activity Exception required a nexus between the
commercial activity that was the basis for the invocation of the
exception and the directly harmful effect within the U.S. 88 In Nelson,
an American employee of a hospital in Saudi Arabia was detained and
tortured by the Saudi Arabian Government. 89  The U.S. Supreme
Court dismissed the case based on lack of jurisdiction because the
case did not fall within the Commercial Activity Exception.9" The
plaintiff argued that agents of the hospital recruited him and that,
therefore, the direct effect was felt within the United States.
91
However, the Court found this direct effect insufficient to establish
subject matter jurisdiction, because the alleged commercial activity,
"purchasing supplies and equipment for the hospital, had no nexus
with the personal injuries alleged in the complaint." 92 Thus, there
must be some nexus between the two elements-the injury and the
commercial activity-before a U.S. court will hear an ATS case
against a foreign sovereign under this exception.
93
2. Expropriation Exception
The Expropriation Exception applies to substantial and non-
frivolous claims against a foreign state for taking property in violation
of international law. 94 A taking contravenes international law if (1) it
does not serve a public purpose; (2) it discriminates against or singles
out aliens for regulation by a state; or (3) the foreign government does
not pay just compensation. 95 The exception normally applies where
the plaintiff is not a citizen of the defendant country at the time of the
Exception "withdraws immunity in cases involving essentially private commercial
activities of foreign sovereigns that have an impact within the United States")
(citations omitted).
88. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1992).
89. Id. at 352-53.
90. Id. at 351.
91. Id. at 354-55.
92. Id. at 354-55 (internal citation omitted).
93. See generally Nelson, 507 U.S. 349.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2012).
95. Altmann v. Rep. of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir. 2002).
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taking. 96 As will be discussed in detail in Part II.A., this exception
applied, and thus the FSIA did not bar the action, in the recent case of
Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, where plaintiffs alleged the Ottoman
Empire stripped ethnic Armenians of their property in violation of
international law.
97
3. State Sponsors of Terrorism Exception
In 1996, the political branches of the U.S. government amended
the FSIA to add an additional tool for courts to hold foreign
sovereigns accountable for violations of international law. 98 The State
Sponsors of Terrorism Exception enables U.S. citizens to bring
personal injury claims against foreign sovereigns in cases involving
"torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the
provision of material support or resources for such an act ... by an
official, employee, or agent" of a foreign state, in the course and scope
of office. 99 The exception was developed in response to the hi-jacking
of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland.100 During that hi-
jacking, Libyan terrorists detonated a bomb that killed 259 passengers
and crew, destroyed the plane, and rained wreckage onto the village of
Lockerbie, killing eleven civilians.101 After an investigation, U.S.
authorities concluded the terrorists were acting on behalf of the
Libyan government.10 2 The State Sponsors of Terrorism Exception
was thereafter enacted to provide U.S. victims a mechanism to obtain
civil damages against the Libyan government. 103
96. Siderman de Blake v. Rep. of Arg., 965 F.2d, 699, 711 (quoting Chuidian
v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.3d 1095, 1105 (9th Cir. 1990)).
97. See infra Part H.A.
98. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(7), amended by Nat'l
Defense Auth. Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3
(current version codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012))).
99. 28 U.S.C. 1605A(a)(1) (2012).
100. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 37, at 94-96.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(a) (2012) (discussing plaintiffs
recourse under the exception). Because the act occurred over Scotland-a foreign
state-the U.S. plaintiffs were required to offer Libya an opportunity to arbitrate the
claim. See id § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(II)(iii).
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Unlike the Commercial Activity Exception, the state sponsorship
exception requires the direct involvement of the executive branch; the
U.S. State Department must designate a state as a state sponsor of
terrorism for a plaintiff to invoke this exception.1 0 4  Accordingly,
jurisdiction over claims arising under this exception will exist where
"the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the
time [of the terrorist act] ... or was so designated as a result of such
act .... "105 At present, Iran, Sudan, and Syria are the only states
designated as state sponsors of terrorism.
10 6
Importantly, the exception's requirement of executive designation
indicates that the power to adjudicate terrorism cases was not
delegated exclusively to the judiciary. Rather, the exception makes
explicit that the Executive must make an initial policy decision by
way of a state sponsorship designation. 1 7  Yet, the text of the
statutory exception reflects that the legislative branch acknowledges
and is responsive to the needs of the judiciary effectively to adjudicate
violations of international law; the judiciary should, therefore, not
infer the requirement of an initial policy determination unless it has
been specifically imposed by the legislature.
C. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is a judicially created doctrine
rooted in principles of separation of powers and judicial restraint.10 8
Where ruling on an issue would require a political determination, the
judiciary may invoke this doctrine to avoid ruling where it is more
appropriate under the circumstances to defer to the political
branches.10 9 Importantly, however, the separation of powers works in
104. Id. § 1605A(a)(2)(a).
105. Id.
106. State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited May 29, 2015). Iraq was
removed from the list in 2004, Libya in 2006, and North Korea in 2008; Cuba was
removed from the list in May 2015. See generally id.
107. Id. § 1605A(a)(2)(a). In this regard, the State Sponsors of Terrorism
Exception is distinct from the Commercial Activity and Expropriations Exceptions,
which do not require any "direct action" by the Executive in order for the courts to
determine immunity.
108. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962)
109. Id. at 213-14.
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both directions: "If courts are unfit to conduct foreign policy, so too
are foreign policy experts unfit to vindicate individual rights."
110
Where individual rights are interlinked with foreign affairs, a
balancing of the overlapping responsibilities of each branch is
required to determine whether the issue is justiciable. 111
This doctrine of justiciability traces back to Marbury v. Madison,
although "its modem formulation comes from Baker v. Carr."11 2 In
Marbury, the Supreme Court distinguished political questions from
questions of individual rights, holding that only the latter were
justiciable.1 1 3 "The distinction is intuitively sound-no one would
doubt that courts are expert at remedying individual wrongs, and it is
scarcely more controversial to point out that judicial review makes the
judiciary a natural agent to protect constitutional guarantees against
the tyranny of the majority."1 1 4  As noted, however, the modem
preeminent case on the political question doctrine is Baker v. Carr.
1 1 5
In Baker, the Supreme Court articulated six independent tests to
determine whether an issue is a nonjusticiable political question,
listing them in descending order of importance and certainty. 
116
Under Baker, a court should defer to the political branches on an
issue when there is found:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of
110. Developments in the Law-Access to Courts, The Political Question
Doctrine, Executive Deference, and Foreign Relations, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1193,
1200 (2009) [hereinafter HARV. Note].
111. See id. at 1201-04.
112. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also
Thomas R. Sutcliffe, Note, "The Nile Reconstituted": Executive Statements,
International Human Rights Litigation, and the Political Question Doctrine, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 295, 300 (2009).
113. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
114. HARV. Note, supra note 110, at 1200.
115. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Sutcliffe, supra note 112, at
300-01.
116. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78 (2004). See also Baker, 369
U.S. at 217 (enumerating the six tests for justiciability).
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a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5]
an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
117
The first three parts of the Baker test concern the separation of
powers; the last three concern issues of respect.11 8 Dismissal on the
basis of the political question doctrine is appropriate only if one of
these formulations is "inextricable" from the case. 
1 1 9
II. COURTS ARE INAPPROPRIATELY USING THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE TO AVOID DECIDING INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS CASES
Where individual rights are interlinked with foreign affairs, as is
the case with ATS claims, courts should balance the overlapping
responsibilities of each branch of government to determine whether an
issue is justiciable. At present, however, courts have unnecessarily
complicated and confused the analysis of ATS claims by squarely
addressing the political question doctrine. In ATS cases where the
defendant is a sovereign state, thus implicating the FSIA, courts
should not apply the political question doctrine, because the policy
considerations underlying that doctrine are sufficiently addressed as
part of the FSIA analysis. Where the FSIA is not implicated, judicial
deference to the executive branch through the application of the
political question doctrine should be minimized. Doing so would
ensure that victims of human rights violations' ability to bring suit in
U.S. courts is determined based on legal standards rather than on the
executive branch's desire to prevent adjudication of suits for political
reasons.
117. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
118. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
119. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278.
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A. In ATS Cases Against Foreign Sovereigns, Applying the Political
Question Doctrine is Improper
Narrowly construing the FSIA and ATS, combined with liberally
construing the political question doctrine, improperly allows the
executive branch to exert excessive control over ATS cases, and
precludes victims of horrific, unlawful, state-sanctioned violence from
obtaining justice. Although the normative argument that applying the
political question doctrine to human rights cases brought under the
ATS creates a barrier to justice for victims is obvious,1 20 the doctrinal
arguments are perhaps more compelling. One primary purpose of the
FSIA was to "eliminate[e] political participation in the resolution of
such claims. 12 1 Therefore, courts should not defer to the executive
branch by dismissing an FSIA case as a nonjusticiable political
question. Indeed, the separation of powers is not a one-way street.
1 22
Courts should apply the clear standards articulated in the FSIA
rather than defer to the Executive on a case-by-case basis. Excessive
deference to the executive branch on issues properly before the court
necessarily results in uneven application of the law, and is contrary to
the legislative purposes of the ATS and the FSIA. Indeed, applying
the political question doctrine in ATS cases against foreign sovereigns
improperly allows for variances in judicial deference to the Executive
resulting from political prejudices for or against the particularly
involved nation.1 23  In addition, applying the political question
doctrine to dismiss ATS claims does not comport with the purpose of
the doctrine. The policy justifications for the political question
doctrine already overlap with those of the FSIA; thus, those policy
considerations are sufficiently addressed as part of the FSIA analysis,
and judicial imposition of an additional political question doctrine
analysis is duplicative. In other words, whether the judiciary may
appropriately review a challenged sovereign state act is precisely the
120. Due to disparities in power, victims of egregious violations of
international law already face uphill battles in bringing suit against their
governments; indeed, evidence is likely in the hands of the state, and some suits are
brought decades after the violations actually occurred. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v.
Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
121. Rep. of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004).
122. See Skinner, supra note 17, at 102; HARV. Note, supra note 110, at 1200.
123. See Skinner, supra note 17, at 100.
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question the exceptions to the FSIA's implementation of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity are intended to address. That
implementation, too, is pursuant to standards articulated by the
political branches. Accordingly, the need for a political question
doctrine analysis is obviated by FSIA's own terms.
In Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, the District Court for the
Central District of California engaged in this inappropriate duplicative
analysis in deciding "whether it had jurisdiction under the FSIA and,
if so, whether other concerns warrant dismissal." 1 24 Plaintiffs asserted
claims under the ATS against the Republic of Turkey, or its
predecessor government under the Ottoman Empire, which moved for
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA. 1 25
The court found that the FSIA did not bar the action, because the
Expropriation Exception applied where the pleadings present a
cognizable claim that the defendants had taken property in violation of
international law. 12 6 However, the district court dismissed the case,
holding that it could not adjudicate the matter because the alleged
violation of international law-genocide-was too political a
determination.1 27 The district court believed that adjudication would
"involve judicial interference in foreign affairs," and that it "[could
not] resolve such an inherently political question that our Constitution
124. Davoyan v. Turkey, No. CV 10-05636 DMG-SS, slip op. at 1 (C.D. Cal.
March 26, 2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-55742 (9th Cir. May 2, 2013).
125. Id. at 2, 8. While it was, in fact, the bank defendants who moved for
dismissal under the FSIA, they were treated by the court as instrumentalities of the
Republic of Turkey, and presumed immune. Id. at 9. Thus, the discussion infra
refers to defendants as the Republic of Turkey.
126. Id. at 15, 18, 21-22. In determining whether it had jurisdiction under the
Expropriation Exception, the court had to determine whether Plaintiffs' property
was taken in violation for international law. Id. at 15. However, "[flor a
jurisdictional challenge to the pleadings under the FSIA, the Court need not decide
whether the taking actually violated international law; as long as a claim is
substantial and non-frivolous, it provides a sufficient basis for the exercise of...
jurisdiction." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
127. Id. at 25. Although the court found that plaintiffs established subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA on the pleadings, the court explained that,
moving forward, "to establish subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, Plaintiffs
must prove that the actions of the Republic of Turkey and its predecessor state, the
Ottoman Empire, amounted to 'genocide,' because only that type of egregious
conduct would violate international law." Id. at 15, 23.
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reserves for the other two coordinate branches of government."'128
Absent an executive statement indicating that the political branches
believed the defendants had committed genocide, the court refused to
permit the plaintiff to use genocide as the basis for the claim. 129
The district court's application of the political question doctrine in
Davoyan is flawed in that it: (1) afforded double-deference to the
Executive, contrary to separation of powers; (2) allowed the court to
improperly avoid its duty to adjudicate the case; and (3)
mischaracterized the question of whether conduct amounts to
genocide as "too political a determination," notwithstanding the clear
and manageable judicial standards for making such a determination.
First, applying the political question doctrine was duplicative in
light of the court's finding that an exception to the FSIA applied. The
court's belief that it needed executive permission to hear the case was,
in fact, contrary to separation of powers, because the FSIA analysis
already reflected proper deference to the executive branch. For that
reason, the court inappropriately deferred to the Executive by
dismissing the case as a political question.1 30
Additionally, deferring to the political branches with regard to
FSIA cases defies the purpose of the FSIA and the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity. 13 1 By dismissing the case based on the political
question doctrine, the district court disregarded the FSIA's restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity and, rather, imposed the former
requirement of an individualized executive determination regarding
immunity. Such an interpretation is contrary to the principle of
separation of powers: the political branches traditionally enact
legislation, which the courts then apply. 132
Second, by dismissing the action, the Davoyan court refused to
fulfill its responsibility to adjudicate a matter properly before it.
128. Id. at 25.
129. Id.
130. The FSIA reflects the intent of the political branches to delegate
resolution of certain cases relating to foreign sovereigns to the judiciary, even
though these cases inherently touch on foreign affairs. See supra Part I.B.
131. See Brock, supra note 63, at 802-04; see also Kleindienst Letter, supra
note 66 (noting that the practice prior to the enactment of FSIA put the State
Department "in the difficult position of effectively determining whether the plaintiff
will have his day in court").
132. See Skinner, supra note 17, at 102.
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Where a statute grants the court jurisdiction over particular subject
matter and articulates standards for adjudication, courts should hear
those cases on their merits in compliance with Article III of the U.S.
Constitution. 33 The FSIA and ATS provide courts with the authority
and necessary standards to decide these cases, notwithstanding the fact
that they inherently touch on foreign affairs.1 34 Therefore, the court's
application of the political question doctrine to these claims was
improper.
Third, notwithstanding that the political question doctrine should
not have even been considered, the Davoyan court misapplied it.
1 35
By finding that the determination as to whether conduct amounts
"genocide" was reserved to the political branches of government, the
court affirmatively based its dismissal on executive inaction-namely,
the absence of an executive statement. This was improper.
Admittedly, where a case is brought under the State Sponsors of
Terrorism Exception to the FSIA, explicit executive action is
necessary for the judiciary to hear it.1 36 Here, however, the court
found the Expropriation Exception applied; therefore, it should not
have dismissed the case based on inaction by the executive branch.
More specifically, by predicating jurisdiction on an executive
statement that the defendant's conduct amounted to genocide, the
court incorrectly applied the standard regarding executive statements.
The absence of executive action is not dispositive on the political
question issue. Rather, where the Executive has remained silent, the
question is whether the claim is of the type committed to the political
branches for resolution.1 37 In such circumstances, the courts need not
apply a policy of case-specific deference to the political branches.1
38
Because there was no executive action in Davoyan, the court should
have focused its analysis to the type of claim asserted-genocide.
133. See id.
134. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (ATS); 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012) (FSIA).
135. This reflects a disturbing trend of courts applying the political question
doctrine mechanically to avoid hearing ATS cases, discussed infra.
136. Importantly, cases brought or pursued under other FSIA exceptions do
not contain a similar requirement. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012), and id.
§ 1605(a)(3), with id. § 1605A(a)(2).
137. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 549-51 (9th Cir. 2005).
138. Id. at 556 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Maachain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21
(2004)).
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Genocide is a violation of universally recognized norms of
international law-precisely the type of claim the ATS was designed
to pursue.1 39  Accordingly, a claim of genocide is not the type
committed to the political branches for resolution, and the judiciary
may properly decide such a case.
The judiciary has clear standards for determining whether conduct
amounts to genocide, which "obviates any need [for the judiciary] to
make initial policy decisions of the kind normally reserved for
nonjudicial discretion," and further reduces concerns that the claim
"relate[s] to matters that are constitutionally committed to another
branch."1 40 As the Davoyan court acknowledged in its analysis, "It is
settled in the Ninth Circuit that genocide violates international law." 
1 41
In addition to norms of international law, judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for adjudicating the issue of genocide are
contained in the Genocide Convention, an international treaty to
which the U.S. is a party.1 42 Therefore, the claim in Davoyan simply
required the court interpret and apply the law; the case was improperly
dismissed as a nonjusticiable political question. 143
139. See BENCHBOOK, supra note 2, at III.E-7-8.
140. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 227-29 (1993).
141. Davoyan v. Turkey, No. CV 10-05636 DMG-SS, slip op. at 20 (C.D. Cal.
March 26, 2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-55742 (9th Cir. May 2, 2013) (citing
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 759 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated on
other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) ("Claims of genocide, therefore, fall within
the limited category of claims constituting a violation of internationally accepted
norms for [Alien Tort Statute] jurisdiction.")).
142. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241-42 (noting that the Genocide Convention
entered into force for the United States on Feb. 23, 1989, and "provides a ...
specific articulation of the prohibition of genocide in international law"). See
generally Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
G.A. Res. 260 (III), U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(JJ) (Dec. 9, 1948) (the Genocide
Convention).
143. The task before the Davoyan court was similar to that required of the
Supreme Court in Japan Whaling Association, which was held justiciable and
properly adjudicated by the Supreme Court. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am.
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986) ("[U]nder the Constitution, one of the
Judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this
responsibility merely because our decision may have significant political
overtones.").
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The misapplication of the political question doctrine in Davoyan
is not an anomaly. In Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, women from China,
Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines, alleging they had been
compelled to provide sexual services for Japanese soldiers during
World War II, attempted to sue the Japanese government in a U.S.
court under the ATS. 144  Initially, the district court held that the
alleged conduct did not fall within the Commercial Activity
Exception, and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction under the
FSIA. 1 45 On appeal, the appellate court declined to rule on whether
Japan's conduct fell within the Commercial Activity Exception, but
dismissed the case under the political question doctrine. 146
Subsequently, the court was criticized for being overly deferential to
the Executive in refusing to hear the case on its merits: "Rather than
taking responsibility for any substantive decision, [the court] used the
political question doctrine to shift decision-making responsibility to
the executive." 147
These cases, and others like them, represent a recent and flawed
development in the application of the political question doctrine as a
mechanism to dismiss human rights claims for fear of impeding upon
the separation of powers.1 48 As discussed supra, where an ATS case
implicates the FSIA, the legislature has already addressed issues of
separation of powers and given courts the means to adjudicate these
claims. The judiciary should recognize that these statutes give the
courts the power and responsibility to hear cases where jurisdiction is
proper under the ATS and FSIA.
Applying the political question doctrine in cases against foreign
sovereigns is also problematic in that it is often unevenly applied
based on the political value of the relationship between the U.S. and
the involved foreign state. 149 For example, although some court, as in
144. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
145. Id. at 46-47. The district court alternatively held that the complaint
presented a nonjusticiable political question. Id. at 47.
146. Id. at 47, 52-53.
147. Cheah Wui Ling, Walking the Long Road in Solidarity and Hope: A Case
Study of the "Comfort Women" Movement's Deployment of Human Rights
Discourse, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 89 (2009).
148. See id.
149. See Skinner, supra note 17, at 100 ("[The political question doctrine]
has ... allowed inappropriate biases and prejudices-whether conscious or not-to
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Davoyan, invoke the political question doctrine to avoid reaching the
merits of a case, other courts opt to apply the doctrine "lightly" or
decline to utilize the doctrine altogether.
In Vine v. Iraq, the district court rejected Iraq's argument that the
case presented a nonjusticiable political question, because allowing
the case to go forward would undermine the efforts of the President
and Congress to create a stable Iraq. 50  In affirming the district
court's rejection of Iraq's political question argument, the appellate
court reasoned on appeal that:
To be sure, the foreign policy considerations Iraq raises are
important, as the President's actions and statements make clear.
But Iraq has not explained how adjudicating the question...
requires the court to address any question the Constitution commits
to the political branches. Indeed, Iraq does nothing more than
assert that this action may affect the foreign relations of the United
States, but that is surely not enough.
1 51
Thus, the political question doctrine was not applied as a bar to the
plaintiffs' claims against Iraq notwithstanding foreign policy
considerations and the President's position that "the threat of a
monetary judgment against Iraq contravenes the foreign policy of the
United States."1 52
interfere with a court's decision to hear otherwise proper and justiciable cases."); see
also Adam N. Schupack, Note, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and Civil Litigation
Against Terrorism, 60 DuKE L.J. 207, 233-36 (2010) (discussing how in civil
litigation related to the Arab-Israeli conflict, courts do not apply the political
question doctrine uniformly and are sensitive to surrounding politics); Noura Erakat,
Litigating the Arab-Israeli Conflict: The Politicization of U.S. Federal Courtrooms,
2 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIc L. 27, 29 (2009) ("The uniformity of judicial
outcomes involving Palestinian plaintiffs and defendants is a function of their
politicization, meaning their adjudication according to foreign policy interests
irrespective of the legal questions at hand.").
150. Vine v. Iraq, 459 F. Supp. 2d 10, 19-20 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd in part sub
nom. Simon v. Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rev'd sub. nom. Iraq v. Beaty,
556 U.S. 848 (2009) and vacated, 330 F. App'x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009) and aff'd sub
nom. Simon v. Iraq, 330 F. App'x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
151. Simon, 529 F.3d at 1197.
152. Id. The Supreme Court later reversed the appellate court decision,
finding that the President had suspended the applicable FSIA exception with respect
to Iraq, and thus the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims. Beaty, 556 U.S. at
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Courts have unevenly applied the political question doctrine
depending not only on the foreign entity involved, but also on the type
of claim pursued. As one commentator noted:
U.S. courts do not apply the political question doctrine uniformly to
refrain from involvement in all cases involving the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Despite the particularly contentious nature of the conflict,
when plaintiffs have sued under the [ATS] and the state sponsor of
terrorism exception to the FSIA, courts have refused to dismiss the
cases on political question grounds.
1 53
It has also been suggested that "[p]olitical considerations underlie
these decisions, and the courts have largely deferred to the judgment
of at least one of the political branches in deciding whether to rule on
these cases."1 54 In other words, whether a court applies the political
question doctrine to dismiss a case may be influenced by policy
judgments implicit either in Congress' decision to enact statutes under
which certain, but not other, foreign sovereigns may be sued, or in the
Executive's decision to intercede only in some cases but not others.1 55
The uneven application of the political question doctrine for
political reasons demonstrates the problem of granting excessive
deference to the Executive with regard to dismissing ATS and FSIA
claims. Applying the political question doctrine to FSIA cases results
in undue deference to the executive branch and supplants legal
considerations for political ones. 156 The ability of plaintiffs to sue
foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts should be determined based on
applicable legal standards provided in the ATS and the FSIA, rather
than the political value of the relationship between the U.S. and the
foreign state defendant.
856-57, 866. Thus, the Supreme Court did not reach the political question issue.
See id. at 848.
153. Schupack, supra note 149, at 234.
154. Id. at 235.
155. See id.
156. See Erakat, supra note 149, at 29.
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B. Even Where the FSIA is NOT Implicated, Applying the Political
Question Doctrine is Inappropriate
Where the FSIA analysis is not triggered-as in cases against U.S.
defendants rather than foreign sovereigns1 57 -the political question
analysis is not necessarily duplicative. However, the recent trend of
broadly invoking the political question doctrine represents a troubling
departure from political question doctrine precedent holding that
merely because a dispute involves a political question does not mean
that it necessarily should be dismissed as nonjusticiable.1 58  As
discussed infra, applying the political question doctrine as a de facto
bar to ATS cases against the U.S. and its political allies contravenes
the doctrine's underlying purpose. More specifically, although
foreign relations are generally committed to the political branches of
government, the Baker Court cautioned that not all questions
involving political issues are nonjusticiable. 159 Indeed, Baker
instructs courts to perform a case-by-case analysis to determine
whether the question posed lies beyond judicial cognizance.1 60 Thus,
in domestic ATS cases involving human rights, deference to the
executive branch through the application of the political question
doctrine should be minimal.
The first Baker factor-constitutional commitment of an issue to a
coordinate branch 1 61-should never warrant dismissal where a
plaintiff pleads a cognizable claim under the ATS for human rights
violations. As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted,
"[T]he department to whom [an ATS suit] has been 'constitutionally
committed' is none other than our own-the Judiciary." 162 Indeed, the
first Congress enacted the ATS as part of the First Judiciary Act in
157. It is likely that future ATS cases will increasingly involve U.S.
defendants in light of the requirement imposed in Kiobel that the alleged harm
"touch and concern" U.S. territory. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct.
1659, 1669 (2013). Such a requirement is necessarily a lesser hurdle in cases where
one or more parties are based in the U.S.
158. E.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30
(1986) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 S. Ct. 691, 706-07 (1969)).
159. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-12 (1962).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 217.
162. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
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1789 to provide a forum and remedy for this category of cases.1 63
Thus, ATS claims involve liability "under a well-defined statutory
scheme-a statutory scheme that was enacted by both houses of
Congress and signed by the President," 1 64 and are not nonjusticiable
political questions.
Several courts addressing domestic ATS claims have focused
analyses on foreign policy decisions implicated by the ATS claim in
concluding that dismissal was warranted because foreign policy
decisions are constitutionally committed to other branches. In
Schneider v. Kissinger, a D.C. circuit court dismissed a case brought
against the U.S. and the former U.S. National Security Advisor,
finding that the claims involved nonjusticiable political questions of
foreign policy.1 65 There, plaintiffs were the children of a Chilean
general who was kidnapped and killed by plotters of the September
11, 1971 Chilean coup. 166 Seeking relief under the ATS, the plaintiffs
alleged that, in furtherance of the military coup, the U.S. defendants
had caused the kidnapping, torture, and killing of their father in
violation of international law. 167 The case was dismissed under the
political question doctrine on the basis that the claims challenged U.S.
foreign policy decisions within the exclusive province of the political
branches. 
168
A year later, in Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, the D.C. circuit court
reaffirmed the reasoning of Schneider, finding allegations that the
U.S. government was liable to victims of human rights abuses
allegedly carried out in concert with the Chilean government
presented a nonjusticiable political question.1 69 As in Schneider, the
Gonzalez-Vera plaintiffs sued the U.S. and former Secretary of State
and National Security Advisor for measures allegedly taken to
163. Skinner, supra note 17, at 100.
164. Vine v. Iraq, 459 F. Supp. 2d 10, 20 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd in part sub
nom. Simon v. Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rev'd sub. nom. Iraq v. Beaty,
556 U.S. 848 (2009) and vacated, 330 F. App'x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009) and aff'd sub
nom. Simon v. Iraq, 330 F. App'x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
165. Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 198, 200-01 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
166. Id. at 191.
167. Id. at 191-92.
168. Id. at 195, 198.
169. Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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implement U.S. policy with respect to Chile. 7 ° Finding the claims
indistinguishable from those advanced in Schneider, the court
dismissed the case because the challenged actions "were inextricably
intertwined with the underlying foreign policy decisions
constitutionally committed to the political branches."1
71
Again, the court held similarly in Bancoult v. MacNamara.1 72 In
Bancoult, former residents of the Chagos Archipelago sued senior
officials in the U.S. Departments of Defense and State under the ATS
for allegedly forcibly removing them from their homes in order to
construct a military base.1 73  The plaintiffs alleged that the U.S.
conduct in the removal process constituted "forced relocation; torture;
racial discrimination; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment;
genocide; intentional infliction of emotional distress; negligence;
trespass; and destruction of real and personal property."1 74 Although
conceding that the decision to establish the military base was a
nonjusticiable political question, the plaintiffs claimed that the manner
in which the policy decision was implemented was distinct from the
policy itself and thus was reviewable.1 75 Relying on Schneider, the
Bancoult court found that "the specific steps taken to establish the
base did not merely touch on foreign policy, but rather constituted
foreign policy decisions themselves," and therefore affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the case as a nonjusticiable political question.1 76
The reasoning in Schneider and Gonzalez-Vera created an
insurmountable barrier for victims of human rights violations
occurring during the 1970 Chilean coup; in effect, the court in both
cases applied the political question doctrine and executive deference
in a manner that precluded the plaintiffs from asserting ATS claims in
U.S. courts. The Bancoult court further reduced the ability of foreign
plaintiffs to gain relief against U.S. defendants in U.S. courts under
the ATS by interpreting nonjusticiable foreign policy decisions to
170. Id. at 1261.
171. Id. at 1263-64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
173. Id. at 429-31.
174. Id. at 431.
175. Id. at 436.
176. Id. at 437-38.
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include-not only the foreign policy decision itself-but also the
manner in which foreign policy decisions are implemented. 177
Collectively, these cases demonstrate the misapplication of the
political question doctrine as to U.S. domestic defendants. As the
Supreme Court reaffirmed in Japan Whaling Association, even though
the Constitution committed foreign affairs to the executive and
legislative branches, the judiciary remains capable of analyzing purely
legal questions. 178 Moreover, the Supreme Court has explicitly stated
that the executive branch's views on legal questions "merit no special
deference." 1 79  Therefore, ATS claims are not and should not be
adjudicated nonjusticiable political questions.
In contrast to the aforementioned cases, the court in Alperin v.
Vatican Bank properly recognized the judiciary's ability to decide
cases involving political issues.1 80 There, Holocaust survivors sued
the Vatican for conversion, unjust enrichment, restitution, an
accounting, and human rights and international law violations.1 81
While many of the claims "tinge[d] [the] ... case with political
overtones," the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the
property claims could clearly be resolved by the judiciary.1 82
Although the court recognized that "management of foreign affairs
predominantly falls within the sphere of the political branches and the
courts consistently defer to those branches," the court stated,
"[W]hether a court should defer to the political branches is a case-by-
case inquiry because 'it is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance."''1 83 Because there was neither an executive agreement
nor other declaration from the State Department concerning the
resolution of the property claims, the court found no reason for the
177. Id. at 436-38.
178. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30
(1986) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 S. Ct. 691, 706-07 (1969)).
179. Rep. of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004).
180. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005).
181. Id. at 538.
182. Id. at 551-52, 558.
183. Id. at 549 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)).
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judiciary to defer resolution of those issues to a coordinate branch of
government. 1 84
The second Baker factor-"a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving the issue" 1 85-also fails to justify
the dismissal of ATS cases involving human rights violations. Kadic
reaffirmed that, indeed, "universally recognized norms of international
law provide judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
adjudicating [ATS] suits."1 86 The judiciary is capable of hearing tort
cases and may do so, consistent with the Constitution, even where the
tort is a violation of international law.1 87 Still further, the Sosa court
held that violations of international law that are as universally
recognized and specifically defined as the original violations of the
law of nations were in 1789 may properly serve as the basis for
establishing original jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts. 188
The third Baker factor prevents courts from hearing disputes
where resolution would require the judiciary to make an initial policy
determination because policy determinations should be made by the
political branches.1 89 Arguably, this factor is never implicated in a
case brought under the ATS in light of the Kadic decision, because
where judicially discoverable and manageable standards exist, 190 the
need for an initial policy determination by the courts is obviated: that
determination has already been made by the political branches. Thus,
in the context of human rights adjudication under the ATS against
U.S. defendants, the first three Baker factors should never warrant
dismissal.
By contrast, ATS claims involving executive action-or executive
inaction-pose particular separation of powers concerns. Where there
is some prior action by the executive branch-such as a treaty,
agreement, or statement of interest-the remaining Baker factors are
184. See id. at 558.
185. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
186. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (relying on Filartiga
v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (1980)).
187. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
188. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).
189. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
190. See Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249.
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implicated.1 91 More specifically, factors four through six may become
relevant to a discussion of the political question doctrine "only if
judicial resolution of a question would contradict prior decisions taken
by a political branch in those limited contexts where such
contradiction would seriously interfere with important governmental
interests." 1 92 Therefore, whether an ATS claim that implicates prior
action by the executive branch is a nonjusticiable political question
depends on factors including the nature of executive action involved,
the type of judicial review, and the circumstances of the claim. 193
Because "the courts have the authority to construe treaties and
executive agreements," 1 94 cases involving treaties or executive
agreements are not inherently nonjusticiable political questions. For
example, where the Executive has entered into an executive agreement
with a foreign sovereign, courts are capable of assessing whether the
agreement is valid in light of potentially conflicting obligations under
an international treaty. 195 It would be improper, therefore, for the
court to dismiss such a case under the political question doctrine.
Additionally, notwithstanding existing executive agreements, claims
may be found justiciable where judicial resolution would "not require
the refashioning of agreements by coordinate branches of
government," 1 96 but rather, simply require interpreting and applying
the law. 197 Comparably, an executive statement of interest-whereby
the executive branch, acting through the State Department, expresses
its opinion on the implications of exercising jurisdiction over a
particular case-or a lack thereof, would not necessarily preclude or
demand adjudication.1 98 Notwithstanding, an executive statement of
191. See generally id.
192. Id.
193. See infra notes 194-211 and accompanying text.
194. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
195. Id.
196. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 71 (E.D.N.Y
2005), aff'd sub nom. Viet. Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co.,
517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
197. Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 230.
198. Rep. of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701-02 (2004); Alperin v.
Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 556 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Ungaro-Benages v.
Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1236 n.12 (11th Cir. 2004) ("the executive's
statement of interest is entitled to deference, [but] it does not make the litigation
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interest is entitled to respectful consideration and would carry weight
in evaluating the Baker factors generally.1 99 In practice, however,
despite the option to ignore executive statements, "the political
question framework is such a vacuous standard that once an executive
statement enters the picture it effectively subsumes the entire
analysis." 2
0 0
A particular claim may present a nonjusticiable political question,
however, where the President has precluded it by entering into
executive agreements or treaties with foreign sovereigns. 201 Similarly,
a nonjusticiable political question may be found where the Executive
has entered into executive agreements directly related to the subject
matter of the case, and passing judgment would conflict with the
Executive's ability to resolve extraordinarily sensitive issues on a
massive scale. 202 In such circumstances, courts may find decline to
hear the case because an unusual need exists for adherence to a
previously made political decision.
20 3
The absence of executive action, however, is not dispositive on
the political question issue; in light of executive inaction, the question
returns to whether the claim is of the type committed to the political
branches for resolution. 20 4  Courts should not attempt to construe
executive silence as "an implicit endorsement, an objection, or simple
indifference. At best, this silence is a neutral factor." 20 5 Moreover,
where the executive branch remains silent, courts "need not apply ...
non-justiciable"). The Court in Altmann distinguished between the United States'
views on issues of statutory construction, which the Court noted were well within
the province of the judiciary and would be afforded no special deference, and the
State Department's views on "the implications of exercising jurisdiction over
particular petitioners in connection with their alleged conduct," which "might well
be entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the Executive on a particular
question of foreign policy." Altmann, 541 U.S. at 701-02.
199. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 701-02; Alperin, 410 F.3d at 556.
200. Sutcliffe, supra note 112, at 319 ("Because the fourth Baker factor offers
no considerations with which to offset executive statements, these statements
become a law unto themselves.").
201. See, e.g., Alperin, 410 F.3d at 549-551.
202. See, e.g., Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 284-85
(D.N.J. 1999).
203. See, e.g., id.
204. Alperin, 410F.3dat550-51.
205. Id. at 556.
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a policy of case-specific deference to the political branches." 20 6
Accordingly, courts should not dismiss cases based on the political
question doctrine where dismissal either has not been requested or
where the judiciary's responsibility to hear the case outweighs the
Executive's interest.
By contrast, courts should grant some deference to executive
agreements. 20 7 The court in In re Agent Orange Product Liability
Litigation noted that the judiciary may pass judgment on cases
involving executive agreements without necessarily expressing a lack
of respect for the political branches. 208  There, the court noted that
judicial resolution would not "require the refashioning of agreements
by coordinate branches of government." 20 9 Rather, the question for
the court was simply one of interpreting and applying international
law.210 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
held that it had jurisdiction over the claims, because the executive
agreements "between the present Vietnam government and the United
States cited by defendants address[ed] property that was expropriated
or nationalized by Vietnam and future research-they [did] not
address any issue raised in [the] case. 21 Undoubtedly, deference to
an executive statement is important, because the Constitution does
delegate foreign affairs power to the political branches. 21 2 However,
where no executive statement or other indication that the Executive's
206. Id. at 557 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Maachain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21
(2004)).
207. See Rep. of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004); Ungaro-
Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1235-36 (1 1th Cir. 2004).
208. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 71-72 (E.D.N.Y
2005), aff'd sub nom. Viet. Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co.,
517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
209. Id. at 71.
210. Id.; see also Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221,
230 (1986).
211. Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 71.
212. U.S. CONST., art. I-II; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962); see
also Veith v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277 ("Sometimes... the law is that the
judicial department has no business entertaining the claim of unlawfulness-because
the question is entrusted to one of the political branches.").
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interests outweigh those of the judiciary exists, 21 3 courts should not
dismiss cases under the political question doctrine.
Although cases involving U.S defendants may arguably be
nonjusticiable political questions under the sixth Baker factor-the
potential for embarrassment 4 -this is the weakest factor,21 5 and is a
particularly weak justification for dismissing cases involving
grotesque violations of human rights. Assuming arguendo such a
justification does exist, dismissing all ATS suits against the U.S. and
its officials raises normative concerns due to the denial of justice for
victims of wrongful conduct committed in violation of international
law.
Even more troubling, is that courts have blindly deferred to
executive requests for dismissal based on this weak justification of
political embarrassment when the U.S. is not a defendant. 21 6  For
example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed an ATS
case alleging the wrongful death of sixteen Palestinians and one
American. 21 7 In Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., seventeen members of the
plaintiffs' families were killed when the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
demolished homes in the Palestinian Territories using bulldozers
manufactured by Caterpillar, a U.S. corporation, and paid for by the
U.S. government. 2 18 The plaintiffs claimed that Caterpillar provided
the IDF with equipment it knew would be used to further its home
destruction policy in the Palestine Territories, a policy that violated
international law.21 9 Therefore, plaintiffs argued that Caterpillar aided
and abetted those violations.22
0
213. See generally, e.g., Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform v. Holder, 979
F. Supp. 2d 1, 16 n.7 (D.D.C. 2013) (discussing the role of the court in weighing
relative interests of political branches); Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 29
(D.D.C. 2006) (weighing plaintiff's harm against potential harm to the Executive's
exercise of war powers), vacated by Muaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
214. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
215. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 278 (noting that the Baker factors are likely listed
in descending order of importance).
216. See, e.g., Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007).
217. Id. at 977.
218. Id. at 977-78.
219. Id. at 977, 979.
220. Id.
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Relying on the fact that the U.S. had paid for the bulldozer, the
court found the claims presented a nonjusticiable political question. 221
Notwithstanding the fact that the U.S. government was not a
defendant in the case, the court reasoned, "It is difficult to see how we
could impose liability on Caterpillar without at least implicitly
deciding the propriety of the United States' decision to pay for the
bulldozers which allegedly killed the plaintiffs' family members." 2
22
Because the "[p]laintiffs' claims [could] succeed only if a court
ultimately decide[d] that Caterpillar should not have sold its
bulldozers to the IDF, ,223 granting relief to the plaintiffs would
purportedly require the judiciary to "implicitly question[], and even
condemn[], United States foreign policy toward Israel. 224
Concluding that "[i]t is not the role of the courts to indirectly indict
Israel for violating international law with military equipment the
United States government provided and continues to provide," 225 the
court dismissed the case under the political question doctrine.
226
The court's decision in Corrie was based on its belief that
adjudication of the controversial case would conflict with the
separation of powers by undermining the ability of the political
branches to conduct foreign affairs. 227  The court was heavily
influenced, however, by the Executive's request for dismissal, leading
one commentator to criticize the court for failing to "trace[] the chain
of logic by which hearing the case in question would foster
'embarrassment'; instead [the court] merely followed the State
Department's advice that it would., 228 It is improper for a court to
rely on such an executive statement of interest to decline to exercise
jurisdiction without engaging in the discriminating analysis the
political question doctrine demands. 229 Rather, while an executive
221. Id. at 982-84.
222. Id. at 982.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 984.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 982-84.
228. HARV. Note, supra note 110, at 1199.
229. See Rep. of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701-02 (2004); Corrie,
503 F.3d at 982; Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 556 (9th Cir. 2005); see
also Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank AG, 379 F.3d 1227, 1236 n.12 (11th Cir.
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statement of interest is entitled to respectful consideration and carries
weight in evaluating the Baker factors, 230 the Corrie court should
independently have decided whether hearing the case would foster
embarrassment, as the State Department claimed.231 Still further,
Corrie implicated U.S. policy with Israel, a foreign sovereign in favor
of which there is a judicial trend of disproportionately dismissing
cases as nonjusticiable political questions. 232 Accordingly, the court's
failure to engage in the appropriate case-by-case analysis illustrates
the prejudicial application of the political question doctrine resulting
from excessive deference to the Executive. For that reason, applying
the political question doctrine to dismiss these cases is inappropriate.
CONCLUSION
Davoyan was among the earliest cases brought under the ATS and
Expropriation Exception to the FSIA and dismissed under the political
question doctrine. 233 Yet, Davoyan illustrates the dangerous trajectory
of this doctrine. Courts should rectify this problematic development
to ensure not only that victims are afforded access to justice regardless
of the political importance of their alleged aggressors, but that the
doctrines are applied coherently and consistently as against all foreign
sovereigns. In addition to limiting the application of the political
2004) ("the executive's statement of interest is entitled to deference, [but] it does not
make the litigation non-justiciable").
230. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 701-02; Alperin, 410 F.3d at 556.
231. See HARV. Note, supra note 110, at 1198-99.
232. See, e.g., Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achilles Lauro, 937 F.2d 44, 49 (2d Cir.
1991); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172, 178 (D.D.C.
2004).
233. Compare Davoyan v. Turkey, No. CV 10-05636 DMG-SS, slip op. at 20
(C.D. Cal. March 26, 2013), appeal docketed, No. 13-55742 (9th Cir. May 2, 2013)
(citing Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 759 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), vacated
on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) ("Claims of genocide, therefore, fall
within the limited category of claims constituting a violation of internationally
accepted norms for [Alien Tort Statute] jurisdiction.")), with Altmann, 541 U.S. 677
and Alperin, 410 F.3d 532.
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question doctrine, the political branches could consider widening the
FSIA or the ATS.234
The ATS and FSIA provide an important mechanism for victims
to vindicate violations of international law and be restored to their
original position. The recent trend of federal courts to use the political
question doctrine to avoid hearing these claims is disturbing. It denies
those victims the right to have their cases heard and be granted civil
damages to help repair the wrongs that they have suffered. Moreover,
it is disturbing at a doctrinal level: this is a misapplication of the
political question doctrine. That doctrine was intended to ensure the
of separation of powers. Unfortunately, it is now being used to avoid
the embarrassment of the U.S. and its political friends when those
branches or governments have violated international law. This is not
an issue of separation of powers because the judiciary is not
attempting to fill the role of those branches or governments. Rather, it
is the proper role of the judiciary to pass judgment on the lawful or
unlawful nature of those acts.
234. Unfortunately, this may run afoul of the recent International Court of
Justice decision in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece
intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 99, 80 (Feb. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/143/16883.pdf.
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